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1. Introduction 
The paper aims to suggest a way for OR practitioners to approach value conflicts in 
environmental management. The approach is claimed to be practical and at the same 
time theoretically well founded on three pillars: ethics, neuro-economics, and decision 
sciences. 
The aim springs out of the concern that a rational approach to environmental 
management problems too often is hampered or even perverted by strong emotions 
elicited by value conflicts among stakeholders. Thus, considerable resources are 
frequently squandered on ill founded projects that may have detrimental effects. This 
could be mitigated if the OR analyst has a deeper understanding of ethical reasons for 
choice, as well as knowledge of practical methods to deal with values. 
2. OR relevance 
Environmental management problems involve facts as well as values. It is not only a 
question of being able to predict the outcomes of different actions, but we also need to 
decide whether the outcomes are good or bad. OR embraces an arsenal of tools to predict or 
optimize environmental consequences of human action. This includes System Dynamics, 
which highlights causal relations and dynamic effects; with The Limits to Growth (Meadows 
et al., 1972) as the most celebrated application. OR also embraces the field of Multi Criteria 
Decision Analysis (MCDA) which is designed to deal with values. Thus, OR appears to be 
well equipped to handle environmental problems. This is also evident from the number of 
papers being published in OR outlets on environmental issues. A simple count (May 2011) 
of papers with the word “environmental” in the title, abstract or among the key-words runs 
to 536 in Omega and 1608 in the European Journal of Operational Research. The tallies are 
respectively 96 and 42 for “sustainability”.   
While MCDA has methods to weight decision criteria, it has less to offer when ethical issues 
transcend the mere comparison of values (Wenstøp, 2005). This typically happens in 
environmental management cases where conflicts of rights and sense of duty often preclude 
discussion of consequences. This paper addresses that problem. 
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3. OR literature on value conflicts 
OR has not only a hard mathematical core, but also a rich tradition that emphasizes soft 
methods for structuring problems and to facilitate stakeholder involvement. Jonathan 
Rosenhead, with his Problem Structuring Methods,  is one notable champion (Rosenhead, 
2005). The current paper takes a more analytic approach than this, however. It has an 
emphasis on values and ethics, which can be traced as another OR tradition (Brans and 
Gallo, 2007), (Wenstøp, 2010), and within this tradition there are several publications on 
environmental management. One of the first contributors was Kenneth Boulding (1966) who 
coined the term ‘‘spaceship earth’’, signaling an early warning that energy, material, and 
environmental amenities are limited, and therefore require careful husbandry. More 
recently, Rauschmayer (2001) reflects on the normative foundation of MCDA and argue that 
decision criteria have to reflect not only the interests but possibly all values stemming from 
normative arguments of the decision-maker. This is especially true in environmental 
management where “the integration of values will result in changes of the MCA 
understanding, criteria building, and aggregation method, and will not be possible without 
analytical capacities of the decision analyst in ethics”. Brans (2004) promotes Multi Criteria 
Decision Analysis as a suitable OR tool to take the interests of the stakeholders and Nature 
into account and calls for a multifaceted concept of ethics, consisting of Respect, Multi 
Criteria Management and Happiness. Kunsch (2009) discusses OR techniques to model 
decision-making problems with ethical dimensions, such as sustainability issues in the 
triangle of society, economy and environment, and Brans and Kunsch (2010) propose 
practical OR methods and tools for dealing with sustainability issues. 
Le Menestrel and Van Wassenhove (2004), (2009) discuss the important issue of how to deal 
with the tension between the scientific legitimacy of OR models – where ethics is kept 
outside the models, and the integration of ethics within the models. The current paper is a 
voice in that debate. It takes Wenstøp and Koppang’s (2009) view on OR and value conflicts 
as the point of departure and concludes that OR ought to handle decision problems 
involving value conflicts in environmental management by separating values according to 
ethical category. 
4. Outline 
When value conflicts arise in environmental management – which they often do – emotion 
laden arguments with an ethical undertone are notorious. I start the paper by elucidating 
this by narrating a dialogue regarding invasive aliens between a ‘Socratic’ journalist and a 
state employed environmental manager. I then propose to classify the arguments according 
to the classical ethical categories of virtue, duty and consequence. This makes it possible to 
set the conflict in a theoretical perspective by describing a consilience (Wilson, 1998) among 
the three ethical categories, three classes of values, and three kinds of emotions, and use that 
system to propose how the arguments can be organized and prepared for an OR approach 
to the problem. I finally recommend how OR ought to approach value laden decision 
problems in environmental management. 
5. Case: The alien raccoon dog 
The raccoon dog (Nyctereutes procyonides) is a small animal with short ears and a furry body. 
It enjoys high prestige in Japanese and Korean folklore where it is known as Tanuki, a merry 
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and mischievous rascal, master of disguise, but a bit gullible. It looks somewhat like a 
racoon, but belongs to the same family as the dog. It was introduced to Russia from Korea 
around 1930 because of its fur, where after it migrated westward from Russia and reached 
Finnmark in northern Norway in 1983, where it has been observed six times during 2010. In 
Norway, the raccoon dog is officially considered alien, invasive and possibly detrimental to 
other species. It is considered a potential carrier of tapeworm and rabies. The Directorate for 
Nature Management (DNM) –  one of five governmental agencies under the Ministry of 
Environment – developed an action plan (2008) to prevent its invasion of Norway. It has the 
form of a 17 page document with a front picture of an aggressive raccoon dog attacking a 
Norwegian magpie. It is presented as opportunistic, alien and harmful, a carrier of 
tapeworm and rabies, an alien species that must be exterminated. 
The following is a narrative of an interview published in a Norwegian newspaper (Q) with 
an advisor in DNM (A) (Sætre, 2010). Since one important reason for exterminating the 
raccoon dog is that it may carry tapeworm this was a natural start of the dialogue: 
Q: Dogs and foxes carry tapeworm as well? A: Right, but raccoon dogs wander more. 
Q: Wolves carry rabies too? A: Yes, but raccoon dogs may spread rabies faster. 
Q: The potato is also alien? A: All cultural plants are alien. We wanted them for food. Our 
civilization depends on this. But we think differently now... 
Q: How many raccoon dogs are there in Norway? A: Two, for certain, but there may be 
more. And if we allow them to breed, they will soon threaten our Norwegian animals, who 
have lived in peace and harmony. Sitting ducks are especially vulnerable. 
Q: Why is it more important for us to have ducks than raccoon dogs? A: Hunting; it is a 
traditional pastime to hunt ducks. So this is a value based choice. 
Q: So what you mean is that our values decide for ducks and against raccoon dogs? A: Yes, 
and that is quite legitimate. Hunting traditions you know. The experience of having ducks 
around... 
Q: So we might turn this around then and argue that the raccoon dog is valuable? A: Yes, 
you are free to do that, but the Norwegian policy is to prevent it from establishing itself. If it 
does, we may not even pick blueberries any more because of tapeworms. The raccoon dog is 
Asian and belongs there, not here. Similarly with the mink; it was introduced in 1930, but 
now we shall kill it. The black headed gull, on the other hand, has flown here on its own 
wings, therefore it may stay. 
Q: How long must you have been here, before you are accepted? A: The mink is alien, and 
will never be accepted. 
Q: But the raccoon dog has walked on its own legs from Russia? A: Yes, but it was 
transported from Korea to Russia. Had it walked all the way by itself, it would have been 
different. 
Q: Why are we spending large amounts of money on reintroducing the wolf – which eats us 
– while we shall exterminate the raccoon dog which just plays dead when threatened? A: 
This is a political decision. 
Q: Do you hate raccoon dogs? A: This is not about emotions, but about scientific judgment. 
Q: But still, why will you reintroduce wolves but exterminate the raccoon dog? A: It is a 
question of value based choice.. 
Q: What kind of values? A: What we want with Norwegian nature... 
This case was chosen because it reveals typical human concerns as they shift between rights 
and consequences. We can be emotionally swayed by questions of aliens’ rights, as well as 
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by a sense of duty to preserve or restore the environment to some pristine state. That such 
attitudes are common can be documented by the reactions to the article, “Don't judge 
species on their origins” (Davis et al., 2011). The authors clearly hit a nerve with an amazing 
10 400 hits on a Google search (24.08.2011) with the full title. Most comments seem to be 
supportive of the article, but there are also a number that are negative, such as Hough Snee 
of Perceptible Changes (2011).  Davis et al. observe that “‘non-native’ species have been 
vilified for driving beloved ‘native’ species to extinction and generally polluting ‘natural’ 
environments. Intentionally or not, such characterizations have helped to create a pervasive 
bias against alien species that has been embraced by the public, conservationists, land 
managers and policy-makers, as well as by many scientists, throughout the world.” Their 
main point is that management of introduced species should be based on rational, not 
emotive reasons. Vince (2011) has a similar opinion based on experience from the 
Galápagos, where eradication programs of invasive plants like blackberries have proven 
futile. But on the other hand, the resulting hybrid ecosystem turned actually out to be 
acceptable and could even be “worthy of conservation”. That a species is alien is actually a 
poor predictor of its environmental impacts, which can be detrimental as well as beneficial.  
The issue of being native or alien was first introduced by the English botanist John Henslow 
in 1835. However, it was not until the 1990’s that it became a global public policy to try and 
preserve pristine environments by eradicating aliens (Wittenberg and Cock, 2001) since they 
were considered to be a leading threat to biodiversity and a cost to human enterprises, as 
well as a threat to health. 
6. Ethical theories 
The three classical ethical mindsets of consequentialism, duty ethics, and virtue ethics give 
different reasons for choice (Blackburn, 1998). According to consequentialism, an action is 
morally good if the intended consequences are good. Consequentialism thus makes the 
good prior to the right, and it defines the right operation in terms of promoting the good. 
Thus, a consequentialist looks neither at the nature of the action itself, nor at the character or 
attitude of the decision-maker: only consequences count. This contrasts with Kantian duty 
ethics that defines the right prior to the good. The principle of morality according to 
Immanuel Kant is to act only on that maxim through which you at the same time will that 
should become a universal law. It considers whether the decision-maker has obeyed the 
right principles, and thereby fulfilled her duty or obligations, no matter what the 
consequences are. Finally, virtue ethics is only concerned with the character and attitude of 
the decision-maker; an action is morally right if the relevant virtues have been displayed, 
such as courage, loyalty etc. To be principled is a virtue as well, and this provides a link 
between duty and virtue ethics: to fail at duty ethics is to fail at virtue ethics (Wenstøp and 
Koppang, 2009). The reason I call the three ethical theories ‘mindsets’ is that people are often 
unaware of their own reasons for choice, even though an ethical mindset pervades their 
emotions and thinking. Making people aware of this would provide for better mutual 
understanding in value conflicts (Wenstøp, 2005). 
7. Classification of arguments 
The dialogue in the case has the appearance of a bewildering – sometimes contradictory – 
array of arguments and attitudes, which may become clearer if one could classify them 
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according to reasons for choice. Thus, the three classical ethical theories of virtues, duties 
and consequences are natural candidates.  
One class of arguments in the case describes the character of the alien; the raccoon dog is 
portrayed as evil. While this is sometimes said to vilify human immigrants, it is questionable 
when used against animals. Is a cat playing with a mouse evil, or just inquisitive? Still, it is 
natural to classify such arguments under the label “virtue ethics” since virtue has to do with 
the character of the agent, in this case the raccoon dog. And accusations of want of virtue are 
bound to elicit strong negative emotions such as disgust, anger or xenophobia. 
The next class of arguments is about rights. Who has the right to live in Norway? The 
argument goes that you are okay if you have arrived by walking, but you must walk (or fly) 
the whole way; half is not enough. As rights have to do with laws and rules, I propose to 
classify these arguments under duty ethics. The question of right to land is of course 
problematic, be it human immigrants, plants or animals. But regardless of who the 
transgressor is, violation of perceived rights generally elicits very strong negative emotions. 
Baron and Spranca (1997) have introduced the term ‘protected values’ for values that are 
protected by rules or rights. The dialogue also has an undertone of a sense of duty to 
preserve or restore a pristine environment; an attitude which is prevalent among lay people 
and conversationalists alike. 
The third class of arguments has to do with what we want with Norwegian nature. In other 
words: what would be the consequences if we welcomed the raccoon dog, and do we like 
those consequences? Such issues belong to consequentialism; the value of an action depends 
solely on its consequences. This is the third ethical category and it is interesting to note that 
the answer requires for and against judgments, where the raccoon dog’s character weighs in 
on the scales.  
Consequentialism appears to be the most common attitude among environmental scientists, 
while duty ethics often underpin the attitudes of managers and policy-makers. But 
sometimes there is a hierarchy of ethical platforms: According to the authoritative “Toolkit 
of Best Prevention and Management Practices” for control of “Invasive Alien Species” 
(Wittenberg and Cock, 2001), “the ultimate goal of the strategy should be preservation or 
restoration of healthy ecosystems”. Thus there is a duty to preserve or restore, but then one 
has to define what healthy means. This brings us into the realm of consequentialism where 
one needs to identify criteria for healthiness: “Thus, the initial step in a national programme 
must be to distinguish the harmful from the harmless alien species and identify the impacts 
of the former on native biodiversity.” (Ibid.) 
8. Affect and deliberation  
We have already identified emotions as a factor at work in environmental discussions. To 
understand the deeper connection between ethics and emotions, it is useful to consider the 
emerging field of neuroeconomics, which studies neural correlates of economic decision-
making (Camerer et al., 2005). Neuroscientists use several techniques, such as positron 
emission topography (PET) scanning and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), to 
monitor the location and pattern of neural activity in the brain when decisions are made. 
They have established that there are two kinds of neural processes involved in decision-
making: cognitive and affective. This comes as no surprise; Plato characterized human 
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behavior as riding in a chariot drawn by two horses, reason and passion.  What is new is 
that we can now observe that humans actually are hard-wired in that way, and that the 
processes often compete for dominance. Passion is quick in the onset, sometimes evoking 
immediate action before the slower deliberate processes can become engaged and hinder an 
unreasonable response.   
It is interesting to note the fields of law and economics have different traditions in this 
respect. The concept of homo economicus or ‘economic man’ is strong in economics. Here, 
passions are kept at arm's length, and it is assumed that self-interested actors have the 
ability to make deliberate judgments toward their subjectively defined ends. Law, however, 
incorporates a notion of passion exemplified by the legal maxim Ira furor brevis est (anger is 
short insanity) and this is occasionally used to excuse an offender.  
8.1 Emotions 
Neuroscientists have demonstrated that affective states have somatic correlates, i.e. 
emotions that work together or in competition with reasoning processes to shape decision 
making. Thus, neuroeconomics seeks to bring passion back into economic models to build 
more complete models of human decision processes. Emotions need not be consciously felt, 
but almost all actions seem to be prompted by emotions. They work to improve our affective 
state by giving the body appropriate response signals. The interplay between affective 
processes in our brain and emotions in our body is massively parallel, with many pathways 
working simultaneously and rapidly, supporting the observation that we sometimes act 
before we have time to think.  
8.2 Conation 
According to ancient wisdom, Conatus is one of three parts of the mind, along with the 
affective and cognitive. While feelings come from the affective system and thoughts from 
the cognitive system, the conative system drives how one acts on those thoughts and 
feelings. These classical concepts where known to Aristotle and are congruent with another 
important observation in neuroscience: that cognitive processes alone cannot produce 
action. Conation – the desire to act – requires that the cognitive system works through the 
affective system. Any action is preceded by an emotion. The picture is therefore that 
although the cognitive system is used for searching for options and predicting consequences 
of actions, it cannot evaluate those consequences. That must be done by the affective system. 
Damasio (1994) made notable empirical observations in neuroscience when he discovered 
that people with damage to the prefrontal lobes were emotionally flat when they 
contemplated future consequences of decisions. As a consequence, they were very poor 
decision-makers, sometimes being completely unable to make decision, sometimes making 
decisions that were obviously detrimental to their own well-being. These people had 
severed the connection between the cognitive system and amygdala, which is responsible 
for eliciting somatic responses. According to Damasio, it is the feeling of these emotions that 
prompt action. In the words of Camerer et al. (2005) “It is not enough to “know” what 
should be done; it is also necessary to “feel” it”. Figure 1 shows a model of the two processes 
of affect and deliberation involved in conation. 
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Fig. 1. A model of decision-making between affect and deliberation, adapted from 
Loewenstein and Lerner (2002). Path a: all decisions are prompted by immediate emotions. 
The cognitive pathway a-b-c-d is employed in deliberation, which involves prediction of 
consequences of alternative decisions and how good they will feel. The expected emotions 
influence immediate emotions, which in turn may prompt action. Pathway e is the affective 
pathway caused, for example, by fear or disgust that may affect immediate emotions more 
strongly than expected emotions. 
Figure 1 illustrates the two – often competing – processes involved in conation: The affective 
pathway a-e-a, and the deliberate pathway a-b-c-d-a. Both pathways involve emotions, the 
difference being that they are fast and strong in the affective pathway and slow and 
temperate in the deliberate one. The affective pathway, however, does not involve cognitive 
processes; here one acts without thinking.  
With this background, it is easier to understand the mechanisms behind conflicts in 
environmental management. Conflicts are created by the opposing forces of strong affect in 
some stakeholders and tempered emotions in another stakeholder. For example, pathway e 
represents one stakeholder’s affect resulting from the  perceived virtues of animals – be they 
bad (raccoon dogs) or good (whales). Another stakeholder may have a more balanced 
emotional response elicited through rational deliberation about consequences of actions, 
using the pathway a-b-c-d. Such conflicts can even be intra-personal – as when a person is of 
different minds – not only interpersonal, as when stakeholders argue from the vantage 
points of divergent mindsets. 
8.3 Rationality 
If we want to define rationality in a way that makes rationality bode well for decision-
making, it is important to note that the cognitive pathway in Figure 1 involves emotion, 
suggesting that a good definition of rationality should incorporate it. Since pure thinking is 
not sufficient to prompt action, any concept of rationality that does not incorporate emotion 
would be insufficient. Rationality requires that deliberation about consequences be infused 
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with emotion (pathway b-c-d), while one avoids strong affect (pathway e) that precludes 
thinking. Therefore, a rational decision-maker should be conscious that good decision-
making requires temperate emotions that stir emotions which will then enact decisions 
according to the results of deliberation. Incidentally, the word ‘deliberation’ means literally 
to balance or weigh, and is derived from Latin libra, meaning ‘scale’. 
There are many definitions of rationality available, most of them connecting rationality with 
reason, but we need a definition that incorporates values and lends itself to inclusion of 
emotion.  Føllesdal’s definition of (1982) provides a useful starting point. He defines 
rationality in four dimensions: 
1. Rationality as logical consistency. This pertains to values as well as beliefs, and is the 
central pieces of classical notions of rationality 
2. Rationality as well-foundedness of beliefs. This means that beliefs about facts are well 
supported by available evidence, and that one has made a decent effort at securing 
relevant information. 
3. Rationality as well-foundedness of values. One should have obtained reflective equilibrium 
that gives a stable set of convictions that are relevant for the decision situation. 
4. Rationality of action. In practice, this means application of decision theory including 
maximization of expected utility. 
While Føllesdal and others believe that, based on the principles above, one can use reason to 
determine which decision is rational, the findings in neuroscience suggest otherwise: 
conation—the desire to act – also requires emotion. One has to feel in order to act. We thus 
need to revise the fourth dimension: 
4. Rationality of conation: Elicitation of tempered emotions that enact the beliefs and values. 
The point here is that beliefs about consequences are not enough; one must also have a 
feeling for them. This is the only way we can ensure an ethical consequential decision-
making. 
9. Ethics, values and emotion 
This paper has sketched a picture of a conspicuous consilience among the theories of value, 
ethics and neuroscience, which was first noted by Wenstøp and Myrmel (2006). We used a 
dialogue about control of invasive species as a background, but let us now complete the 
picture, first by using a general organization as an example in this chapter, and then by 
applying it to environmental management in chapter 10. 
First, the character of people can be described in terms of virtues. There are several virtue 
systems such as the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, restraint, and courage) and the 
seven heavenly virtues (chastity, temperance, charity, diligence, patience, kindness, and 
humility). Table 1 shows the most popular corporate core values, which are models for 
peoples’ behavior in companies. Virtuous people are met with positive emotions, but if, on 
the other hand, they display a lack of virtue, negative responses are usually swift and 
strong. Thus, there is a correspondence between virtue, and thereby virtue ethics, and 
affective responses through pathway e in Figure 1, which bypasses the cognitive system in 
people and elicits strong emotions.  
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Value category Ethical theory Emotions Value examples 
Virtues Virtue ethics Strong integrity, honesty, respect, 
openness, fairness, 
innovativeness, 
trustworthiness, creativeness, 
reliability, dignity 
 
Protected 
values 
Duty ethics None Values protected by voluntary 
standards and certificates 
 
Created values Consequentialism Tempered  Stakeholder values such as 
return on equity, work places, 
products and services 
 
Table 1. Correspondence of value category, ethical theory and emotion elicited in decision-
making. Typical organizational values are shown as examples.  
Second, important values are often protected by law, rights or custom; the right to land is a 
notable example with environmental implications. Corporations, for example, sometimes 
subscribe voluntarily to standards or certificates such as the UN’s human rights charter 
against the use of child labor, and international industry standards against pollution, etc. 
Following such guidelines requires no emotion, but transgression is bound to elicit strong 
emotions.  
Third, the intended consequence of organizational actions is creation of value, and in 
general we talk about creating value for the stakeholders. However, stakeholder values are 
often in conflict and decision-making requires making trade-offs among them.  This again 
requires temperate emotions through the cognitive pathway a-b-c-d in Figure 1. See the 
third line in Table 1. 
10. Application to environmental management  
In their paper on value conflicts in OR, Wenstøp and Koppang (2009) propose to benchmark 
conflict potential according to two dimensions: The degree to which the decision criteria 
represent intrinsic rather than instrumental values, and the extent of stakeholder 
involvement. They assume that decision criteria which are only technical means to further 
ends are less likely to create conflicts than if they represent ends that people easily attach 
value to. Further, it makes a difference whether the decision is made on behalf of people – 
such as in a board room, or whether stakeholders participate in the process, which makes 
the conflict potential higher.  
Conflicts in environmental management notoriously engage many stakeholders who will 
differ over intrinsic values, and this therefore makes the conflict potential high. The raccoon 
dog is perhaps a minor threat, but it managed to call the attention of the Directorate for 
Nature Management, ornithologists, hunters, conversationalists, journalists, cabin owners, 
animal protectionists etc. Such conflicts call for a conceptual basis that makes it possible to 
understand peoples’ reasons and the sources and nature of their emotions. Such a 
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conceptual basis was outlined in the previous chapter, and when it is applied to 
environmental management, it takes the form shown in Table 2. 
 
Value category Ethical theory Emotions Examples 
Virtues Virtue ethics Strong Character and intelligence of 
animals, character of human 
agents 
Protected values Duty ethics None Endangered species, special 
biotopes, animal rights 
Created values Consequentialism Tempered  Biodiversity, recreation, 
beauty,  
economic resources, food 
Table 2. Value categories with examples of values in environmental management, the 
underlying ethical theory, and the level of emotions elicited in decision-making contexts.  
10.1 Virtues 
At the end of the sixteenth century, Michel de Montaigne claimed that animals are both 
moral and rational, but it was not until the seventeenth century that the debate gained 
widespread attention (Harrison, 1998).  Such beliefs are still with us today as is evident 
when protectionists claim that animals are virtuous, or the opposite. We have seen how 
raccoon dogs have been vilified. Whales represent an opposite example; they have been 
sanctified and any discussion about whaling notoriously stir very strong emotions (Reiss, 
2008). Such claims defy rationality and as such are not within the domain of OR 
techniques.  
Thus, virtue values are outside the scope of rational approaches. That does not mean that 
they are irrelevant, however. All reasons are relevant but it should be recognized that the 
virtues of a species as a reason for decision must be treated differently from consequential 
reasons since they cannot be traded off on the same scale. 
10.2 Protected values 
Some values are regarded as being sufficiently important to be protected through laws, rules 
or regulations; and obeying them need not involve emotions – only the coldness of a 
bureaucratic heart, or as Weber (1947) put it: “The dominance of a spirit of formalistic 
impersonality, sine ira et studio, without hatred or passion, and hence without affection or 
enthusiasm”. OR needs only to take such rules as frames or restrictions.  
The problem is, however, that some values reach a protected status through emotional 
processes that are not necessarily rational. In the case of invasive species, xenophobia is 
rampant. The question of the rights of aliens, for instance, is provocative, since it is 
impossible to make consistent rules. The simple question, “How long must you be here to 
become native?” defies any logical answer. And since the real reason for pointing the finger 
at alien invasives is that they pose a major threat to biodiversity, the issue should become 
consequentialistic and not a question of rights; emotions should thus be tempered 
accordingly.  
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The same can be said about the xenophobia that is created when alien plants or trees are 
considered a threat to the native landscape. According to Olwig (2003), this notion stems 
from a particular post-Renaissance concept of landscape, space and nature that ultimately 
derives from what he calls a ‘cartographic–pictographic episteme’. Instead of trying to 
protect the existing landscape, we should acknowledge that landscapes do change and 
rather ask what kind of landscape do we want.  
Another dubious protected value is ‘genetic integrity’ (Smout, 2003), which has led to 
campaigns against species introductions that might interbreed with natives. A more 
defensible approach, according to Smout, might be to revive the notion of some species as 
pests, but to hesitate before involving conservation in anything analogous to ethnic 
cleansing for other species. 
10.3 Created values 
The consequences of environmental management are called created values in Figure 1. 
These are the end impacts of actions, and OR embraces a set of tools that is well suited to 
develop consequence models to predict end impacts. System Dynamics is one example from 
this toolbox. But since any action is bound to have several impacts, one also needs to weigh 
them according to importance, for example, how much do we prefer ducks over raccoon 
dogs (or is it the other way around)? For that purpose we need to elicit temperate emotions 
among stakeholder and multi criteria methods may be useful here. See Seip and Wenstøp 
(2006) for an overview. 
Thus, the basic recommendation of this paper is to look at the values and the reasons for 
them first. Put virtues aside as they must be addressed through processes outside OR. 
Question the protected values because they may be consequence values in disguise, and 
address the created values by conventional OR methods. 
10.4 Illustration: Peter Singer on whaling 
The question of whether or not to allow whaling has long been on the international forum 
for environmental management controversies, and few debates are more heated, with 
traditional whaling countries like Japan, Iceland and Norway stand on one side of the issue 
and environmentalists and ethicists on the other. The International Whaling Commission 
(IWC), with 89 member countries, is a central actor with a main duty to keep under review 
and revise the measures that govern the conduct of whaling throughout the world. These 
activities include protecting certain species, designating whale sanctuaries and setting limits 
on the size of catches. While the IWC’s agenda is primarily scientific, based on a 
consequentialistic approach, any member country can reserve itself from decisions that IWC 
makes, and such reservations are usually made on emotional grounds.  
Peter Singer is a well known ethicist and spokesman for animal rights, including whales. Let 
us see what he has to say in this connection (Singer, 2008): “I did not argue that whaling 
should stop because whales are endangered”. But “whales are social mammals with big 
brains, capable of enjoying life and of feeling pain – and not only physical pain, but very 
likely also distress at the loss of one of their group.” He further argues that whales cannot be 
humanely killed, they are too big, and using explosives would mean loss of flesh and oil, 
which is the very reason for hunting whales. “So harpooned whales typically die slowly and 
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painfully.” He concludes that “Causing suffering to innocent beings without an extremely 
weighty reason for doing so is wrong. If there were some life-or-death need that humans 
could meet only by killing whales, perhaps the ethical case against it could be countered. 
But there is no essential human need that requires us to kill whales. Everything we get from 
whales can be obtained without cruelty elsewhere. Thus, whaling is unethical.” 
We see that Singer starts by laying aside the consequential issue of whether whaling is 
sustainable. This is a scientific issue and on the agenda of the International Whaling 
Commission. Instead, he turns to more emotional issues, first by attributing virtue to 
whales, and then by arguing that whales should be protected because of their size – they 
cannot be killed without suffering. He does concede, however, the possibility of a 
consequential trade-off here, but after inspecting the ethical scales, he concludes that whales 
should be protected. 
Thus Singer visits all three ethical categories in his chain of arguments, stirring emotions by 
attributing virtue to whales, as well as to convince the reader that whales should be 
protected to avoid suffering. Regardless of the outcome of a scientific consequential analysis 
of the pros and cons of whaling – such as sustainability against flesh and oil, he concludes 
that whaling is unethical.  
Singer goes on to argue against Japan’s attitude. They say “that it [Japan] wants the 
discussion of whaling to be carried out calmly, on the basis of scientific evidence, without 
“emotion.” The Japanese think that humpback whale numbers have increased sufficiently 
for the killing of 50 to pose no danger to the species. On this narrow point, they might be 
right. But no amount of science can tell us whether or not to kill whales.” He then dismisses 
Japan’s call for an emotionless, scientific evaluation, seeing little added value for the 
Japanese regarding nutrition and health, and then accuses the Japanese of being emotional 
themselves, since the real reason for whaling seems to be to protect the whaling tradition. 
Singer’s arguments are well structured, and it is easy to identify his ethical platforms as 
described in this paper. They are overwhelmingly emotional, however, and therefore not 
susceptible to rational arguments that might be raised from a scientific OR point of view. 
Any decision-maker is therefore left to consider all reasons for and against whaling and use 
his own judgment in the matter. 
10.5 Rational consequentialistic analysis 
In management of operations, ethical decision making should start by separating created 
values from protected values and then proceed to work with the created ones. Protected 
values are highly emotional and not amenable to rational trade-off analysis, while created 
values can be handled through emotionally tempered processes such as multi criteria 
decision analysis (MCDA). See Belton and Stewart (2002) for a thorough presentation of 
MCDA methods. In general, the process runs like this: First one needs to represent the 
created values with quantitative measures, which are called decision criteria (x1, x2,..). Then 
one estimates the consequences of the decision alternatives (A1, A2, …) in terms of decision 
criteria scores. Uncertainty can be represented by probabilities or handled through scenario 
analysis. Since the consequences generally are measured on different scales, it is necessary 
to bring them onto the same scale, which can be done with value- or utility functions. The 
advantage of utility functions is that they represent attitudes towards risk; the disadvantage 
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is that they are more demanding to assess. A decision problem with three alternatives and 
three decision criteria would be described by a table like in Table 3. 
 
 Option 1: A1  Option 2: A2 Option 3: A3 Weight 
Criterion 1  x 1(A1)u11 x 1(A2)u12 x 1(A3)u13 w1 
Criterion 2  x 2(A1)u21 x 2(A2)u22 x 2(A3)u23 w2 
Criterion 3  x 3(A1)u31 x 3(A2)u32 x 3(A3)u33 w3 
Utility  u1 u2 u3  
Table 3. An MCDA decision table with three alternatives and three decision criteria. 
The overall utility of an alternative is usually calculated as the weighted sum of utilities: u1 = 
w1u11 + w2u21 + w3u31, etc. although more complicated functions that include synergy effects 
among the variables are available (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976) . 
In cases with real value conflicts, no decision alternative will dominate the others in the 
sense that it scores better on all criteria, and then the optimal decision will necessarily 
depend on the importance of the criteria, which are represented by weights in Table 3. 
While the scores are beliefs about real consequences, the weights are intrinsically subjective 
and will therefore depend on the values of the decision-maker. This creates two challenges. 
First, for a given decision-maker, one need to obtain the weights with methods that elicits 
temperate emotions through vivid rendering of future scenarios (Wenstøp, 2005). The field 
of MCDA offer several methods for achieving this (Belton and Stewart, 2002). Second, in 
environmental management there will usually be many stakeholders with different values, 
and one way to take these into account, is to try to identify viable compromises through 
suitable processes (Wenstøp and Koppang, 2009). 
Let us now return to the issue of whaling. The two main arguments against whaling in the 
public debate are: (1) it is cruel (Singer, 2008), and (2) whales have rights (Johansen, 2005). 
Singer, as we have seen, stirs emotions in the way he argues that whales cannot possibly be 
killed in a humane way. Against this, the Japanese argue that, yes, by using the electric 
lance, whales can be killed in a humane way, at least if one compares the time it takes before 
the whale dies to what happens in big game hunting (Hayashi, 1996). Thus Hayashi argues 
that whales should not be protected by the humane killing argument, but that one should 
rather allow for trade-offs and treat humane killing as a created value, which then could be 
measured in terms of survival time in the killing process, which should be as short as 
possible.   
The debate concerning man’s rights versus animal’s rights is less amenable to rational 
analysis. From one side the whale is portrayed as a “symbol of the mighty, uncorrupted and 
innocent nature as compared to the greedy, revengeful and morally depraved man”. From 
the other side, man is portrayed as a steward on earth: “When man ate of the tree of 
knowledge, lost his innocence and left paradise there was no way back. Everywhere where 
man went to live he formed the vegetation and the landscape as a consequence of his use of 
nature. Man found his place in competition with and at the sacrifice of other species. He 
crowded out wild animals when they were competitors for food and tamed others as 
working force or used them as producers of food. This was, and still is, a prerequisite for 
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population growth, increased productivity and cultural development. Taming of animals, 
use of animals, and killing of animals for food are indispensable and necessary prerequisites 
for man to be man; that is to build civilizations.”(Johansen, 2005). – It is fair to say that this 
emotional debate defies consequentialistic rationality, and must be fought in a different 
arena. 
Having thus separated created from protected values, one can proceed with those that are 
perceived as created (or destroyed) by whaling and which are amenable to rational analysis 
and trade-offs. Among these are: 
- Sustenance of aborigine populations, measured as the size of populations sustained by 
whaling. 
- Sustenance of costal populations, measured in terms of annual income from whaling. 
- Health improvement from diet based on marine fatty acids, measured in terms of life 
years. 
- Scientific information about ecosystems, especially fish/whale interactions, using the 
number of whales killed as an indicator. 
- Commercial hunting, measured in terms of profit 
- Suffering of whales killed, measured in terms of time spent in agony. 
- Sustainability of whale stock, the size of the stock used as an indicator. 
These created values and others can form the basis of a rational, emotionally tempered, 
analysis of decisions, such as setting quotas for particular whale species. This would involve 
estimation of consequences and subjective weighting, thus producing data that would enter 
a table like Table 3. 
11. Conclusion 
This paper has a modest aim: to argue that conflicts in environmental management can be 
better understood by sorting out the arguments according to the underling ethical platform. 
This provides an understanding of the degree of emotions involved and this platform serves 
as a tool for identifying those values that are consequential and therefore amenable to 
rational trade-off analysis. OR’s proper arena is to provide facts regarding the consequential 
values and to assist in making balanced trade-offs among them. Within its proper domain, 
OR cannot deal with emotion-laden values such as virtues, although processes outside OR 
may be useful. 
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